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possessed a continuing interest in
the entire amount of the loan
agreement. The court noted that in
the absence of such a continuing
interest, the partnership would not
have a valid contract claim. The
FSLIC, therefore, had standing to
assert the D'Oench defense.
Finally, the court concluded that
the D'Oench doctrine also applied
in suits brought by and against the
FSLIC. The court noted that if the
doctrine did not apply, a borrower
could circumvent the policy behind the doctrine by asserting the
claim as a counterclaim rather than
as an affirmative defense. In the
present case, the loan agreement
did not incorporate a release by
UAB of its priority or evidence of a
formal participation agreement between UAB and Commerce. The
court held that because the partnership's breach of contract action
depended on a side agreement not
included in the written agreement
between the parties, the action
must be dismissed.
Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Jones claimed that the D'Oench
doctrine applied only if the FDIC
or the FSLIC acquired an interest
in an asset from a failed bank.
Because the partnership had repaid
the $200,000 initial disbursement,
Judge Jones asserted that the FDIC
did not acquire an interest in an
asset. Therefore, he concluded that
the FSLIC could not use the
D'Oench doctrine to bar the partnership's suit.
Suzi Guemmer

Federal Bankruptcy
Code Does Not Preempt
State and Local Utility
Termination Procedures
In Robinson v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 579
(6th Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state or
local laws governing utility termination procedures. Further, the
court held that Michigan law
barred a claim of liability for utility
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termination against the bankruptcy trustee because the trustee had
acted pursuant to a court order.
Background
Five tenants (the "tenants") resided in an apartment building in
Detroit managed by Woodward
East Management and Rental
Company ("Woodward"). As a result of Woodward's failure to pay
its gas bills, Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. ("MichCon"), discontinued gas service to the building's
heating facility and, with other
creditors, then filed a Chapter 7
involuntary bankruptcy petition
against Woodward.
The bankruptcy court appointed
David Allard ("Allard") as interim
trustee to operate Woodward's
business and directed the tenants
to pay their rent to him. The court
ordered Allard to arrange with
MichCon for gas service to the
building's heating facility and to
pay for the service from the building's rental income. The order entitled MichCon to terminate service
for nonpayment after a five day
notice to the court and interested
parties. Six months later, MichCon
filed notice that it would terminate
service to the building, as Allard
was delinquent in his payments to
MichCon; MichCon then in fact
discontinued service. MichCon
had not notified any of the tenants
prior to the termination, although
it served notice on Woodward and
its creditors.
The tenants then filed a complaint in Wayne County Circuit
Court against Allard and MichCon, alleging violations of state
and local law governing termination of utility service. Specifically,
the tenants first alleged that MichCon discontinued service without
providing proper notice as required by the Detroit Code. Detroit Code §§ 56-4-1-56-4-35. In
addition, the tenants asserted that
Allard was responsible for the termination, and by failing to pay for
the gas he violated city and state
laws. The tenants asked the court
to order Allard to provide heat and
hot water and to pay future gas
bills. Further, the tenants sought
an injunction requiring MichCon
to restore gas service for heat and

hot water and preventing MichCon
from terminating service, except as
provided under the city ordinance.
The circuit court refused to act on
the case while it was pending in the
bankruptcy court.
Allard and MichCon removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan and moved for summary judgment. The tenants
moved to amend their complaint
in order to assert additional state
and municipal claims against Allard and also to remand. The district court granted Allard and
MichCon their motions for summary judgment and deemed moot
the tenants' motions to remand
and to amend. The tenants appealed.
Sixth Circuit Opinion
After finding that the district
court had proper jurisdiction in
this case, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the law of preemption. In
granting summary judgment for
MichCon, the district court had
held that the utility termination
provisions of the federal bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. § 366(b)
(1989), preempted the Detroit
Code provisions, Detroit Code §§
56-4-21-56-4-35, because the local
procedures frustrated the effectiveness of the federal bankruptcy law.
First, MichCon contended that the
federal law explicitly preempted
state and local laws. Second, even
in the absence of express preemption, MichCon asserted, the federal
law implicitly preempted the state
and local laws because the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over debtors' property under the
jurisdiction statute of the Bankruptcy Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(1989).
The Sixth Circuit, however,
found neither argument persuasive. The court found that a federal
law would preempt a state law
under certain circumstances which
included those where there was a
clear expression of congressional
intent to preempt state law or an
actual conflict between federal and
state law.
The Detroit Code directed a
utility not only to notify tenants of
a proposed discontinuation of ser(continued on page 104)
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vice, but also to inform them of
procedures available to prevent a
termination of service. Detroit
Code § 56-4-23. Under the termination provisions, tenants were
permitted to pay rent into an escrow account held by the Department of Buildings and Safety Engineering which in turn would use
those funds to pay the utility bills.
Detroit Code § 56-4-26(c). The
utility was permitted to discontinue service for nonpayment if it did
not receive payment from the account within five days of its request. Detroit Code § 56-4-30.
The court found that section 366
of the federal bankruptcy statute,
11 U.S.C. § 366 (1989), was silent
regarding the procedures a utility
must take in terminating service.
Section 366 merely allowed a utility to discontinue service in the
event a debtor failed to assure
payment within twenty days of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition or
actually failed to pay for the service. Because the statute neither
controlled procedures nor prevented termination of utility service,
the court found that no conflict
existed between it and the local
code. Accordingly, the court ruled
that the Federal Bankruptcy Code
did not preempt the local procedural regulations.
MichCon argued, however, that
the federal law implicitly preempted local law in view of the federal
court's exclusive jurisdiction over
a debtor's property in bankruptcy.
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1989). The Sixth
Circuit emphasized that this grant
of jurisdiction alone did not compel federal and bankruptcy courts
to apply federal law in resolving
matters pending before them. The
court observed the Bankruptcy
Code directed a trustee to administer the bankrupt's estate pursuant
to state law. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)
(1989). Furthermore, federal law
could not preempt state law unless
Congress, at the time of enacting a
federal statute, clearly expressed
its intent to preempt state law. The
court cautioned that bankruptcy
law preemption should be narrowly construed with respect to state
health and safety laws.
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The Sixth Circuit thus determined that because the utility termination provisions of the Detroit
Code does not conflict with federal
law, the federal bankruptcy statute
did not preempt the local code.
Therefore, the court concluded
that because the tenants had alleged valid claims under the local
ordinance, the district court had
erred in granting MichCon's motion for summary judgment.
The tenants next alleged that
Allard violated city and state laws
by causing the termination of gas
service through his failure to pay
MichCon. The tenants limited
their appeal to the district court's
denial of their claim for damages
under the remedy provision of
Michigan bankruptcy law. Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2918(2)(f)
(West 1986). The statute provided
that a tenant may recover damages
if the owner of a building or his
agent unlawfully interfered with a
tenant's possessory interest in the
property, including termination or
interruption of gas service. However, the provision denied the remedy if the owner or his agent acted
pursuant to a court order. Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2918(3)(a)
(West 1986).
In this case, the bankruptcy
court had instructed Allard to use
rent receipts to pay MichCon for
gas service. Yet, the district court
concluded that Allard had insufficient rental income from which to
pay MichCon. Because the tenants
presented no facts to dispute this
conclusion, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's finding that the bankruptcy court order
allowed Allard to forego paying
MichCon.
The tenants contended that even
if the order permitted Allard to
discontinue payments to MichCon, the bankruptcy court could
not authorize violations of state
and local law; they asserted that a
court order to violate state and
local law is not a valid order for
purposes of interpreting Michigan
law.
The Sixth Circuit stated, however, that the tenants' actual challenge was against the content of the
bankruptcy court's order, not the
court's jurisdiction to issue it.
Therefore, the court rejected the

tenants' argument on the ground
that the remedy exception set forth
under Michigan law included all
actions taken in response to a court
order, even if the order was legally
unsound. Consequently, the court
determined that the district court
properly dismissed the claims
against Allard, as set forth in the
original complaint.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, despite having properly held in favor of Allard on the
basis of the tenants' original complaint, the district court erred in
refusing to consider the tenants'
motion to amend. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court
failed to exercise its discretion in
any manner with respect to the
motion to amend. The court directed the lower court to consider
the motion on remand.
The Sixth Circuit thus vacated
the decision of the district court
and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Senior
Judge Brown confirmed the opinion of the majority that federal
bankruptcy law did not regulate
utility termination procedures,
and state and local law controlled.
Judge Brown suggested, however,
that because the tenants properly
relied on local law, the district
court erred not only by holding
that federal bankruptcy law preempted state law, but also by not
applying the only law applicablestate law.
Linda J. Urbanik

The Indiana Supreme
Court Held That the
Household Exclusion
Clause Does Not Violate
Public Policy
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v.

Henry, 563 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind.
1990), the Indiana Supreme Court
held that the household exclusion
clause does not violate Indiana
public policy because it did not
hinder the essential protection of
automobile owners, their families,
and friends from damage inflicted
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